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Abstract 
Distributed internet services involve multiple heterogeneous applications that 
communicate with each other. Guaranteeing their security is in general both mandatory 
and complex. Amongst the many security requirements that have to be guaranteed, 
secure user authentication is one of the most fundamental. Authentication is 
traditionally executed only at login phase, based on username and password. However, 
a single authentication point may not always guarantee a sufficient degree of security, 
especially in the context of critical systems. In a previous work we proposed a 
continuous authentication protocol that applies multiple biometric traits to continuously 
compute its trust in the user. This paper analyzes the security provided by such solution 
through a qualitative risk assessment, focusing on both threats related to transmission 
and specific of the biometric system level. Applying a NIST-compliant threat analysis, 
we identify the main threats and we assess their impact. Finally, we define the required 
countermeasures which allow us improving the security of our authentication solution. 
1 Introduction 
Internet services have become extremely important and today expose functionalities in a huge 
variety of fields, from healthcare and education to business and government. These services should be 
properly protected from cyber-crimes, which can range from theft of confidential information to cyber 
terrorism. In fact, attacks conducted against Internet services may even have catastrophic 
consequences. However, guaranteeing their security is a very complex activity and it usually includes a 
broad set of requirements like authentication, authorization, confidentiality, privacy, and integrity.  
In this paper, we especially focus on authentication, which is defined as the provision of assurance 
in the claimed identity of an entity [1]. The identity verification can be obtained exploiting a piece of 
information and/or a process called authentication factor. Traditionally, the factor employed is a 
password, a PIN (Personal Identification Number), or more generally something that the user knows. 
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Usually, such authentication factor is requested and checked only at login phase, and this may expose 
the system to attacks [2]. 
An interesting alternative is offered by biometric traits, being them physiological or behavioral 
characteristics (as fingerprint or keystroke). Unlike passwords and secrets, biometric traits can be 
acquired continuously through time, and in some cases without active participation of the user e.g., 
when a camera is used to collect a face image. In [2], the CASHMA protocol is presented specifically 
intended for continuously authenticating users of mobile devices through a transparent acquisition of 
their biometric traits. The protocol determines timeouts based on the quality, frequency and type of 
biometric data collected. However, an exhaustive security analysis of the CASHMA protocol with 
respect to cyber-physical attacks have not been performed yet, thus it is uncertain if additional security 
measures to complement the architectural design of [2] would be beneficial. 
In this paper, we present a NIST-compliant [3] qualitative risk assessment of the CASHMA 
protocol [2], in order to identify relevant threats and determine the risks associated with its execution. 
The objective is to evaluate the protocol, analyzing its security guarantees and weaknesses, and 
identifying countermeasures that improve its security. We consider intentional non-physical threats, 
differentiating transport level threats as spoofing, forgery, unauthorized access, eavesdropping, 
message corruption, from (biometric) system level threats, like brute force, sensor spoofing, reuse of 
residuals, database compromise [4], [5], [6], and [7]. A considerable set of threats that we examined 
are not described here because not applicable to CASHMA architecture or because we assess their risk 
as already Very Low thanks to the security and the countermeasures provided by protocol as it is.  
We consider a set of modifications to the protocol that minimize the risk for all the analyzed 
threats whose risk is relevant (Moderate or higher), as shown in Appendix A and Appendix B. Those 
countermeasures, or a subset of them where some are alternative each other, are really recommended 
to be included.  
2  Background and Related Work 
2.1 Internet Services Security 
A Web service relies on some of the same underlying HTTP and Web-based architecture as 
common Web applications; it is susceptible to similar threats and vulnerabilities. Web services 
security is based on several important concepts, including authentication, authorization, integrity, non-
repudiation, confidentiality, privacy [8]. At the transport level, Secure Socket Layer (SSL), whose 
standardized version is known as Transport Layer Security (TLS), is the most widely used 
communication protocol providing authentication of the communicating parties, confidentiality and 
integrity of the exchanged data, which is encrypted and checked for corruption, and also providing 
secure key exchange between client and server. SSL provides a secure communication channel; 
however, when the data is not "in transit," it is not protected. This makes the environment vulnerable 
to attacks in multi-step transactions [9].  
At application level, many challenges are traditionally met with existing standards relying on 
XML frameworks [8]. In addition to typical challenges of web applications, we also have to consider 
the threats to our specific system domain: there are a number of points where a biometric system can 
be attacked. Several, complementary, defensive measures can be taken to minimize the risk [6]. 
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2.2 The CASHMA Approach for Continuous Authentication 
The continuous authentication protocol proposed in [2] improves security and usability of user 
session. The protocol computes adaptive timeouts on the basis of the trust posed in the user activity and 
in the quality and kind of biometric data transparently acquired during their activity. The overall 
system, shown in Figure 1, is composed of the CASHMA authentication service, the clients and the 
web services, connected through secure communication channels [2]. 
The CASHMA authentication service includes: i) an authentication server, which interacts with the 
clients, ii) a set of high-performing computational servers that perform comparisons of biometric data 
for verification of the enrolled users, and iii) databases of templates that contain the biometric templates 
of the enrolled users (these are required for user authentication/verification). The web services are the 
various services that use the CASHMA authentication service and demand the authentication of 
enrolled users to the CASHMA authentication server. These services are potentially any kind of 
Internet service or application with requirements on user authenticity.  
 Finally, by clients we mean the users’ devices that acquire the biometric raw data corresponding to 
the various biometric traits from the users, and transmit those data to the CASHMA authentication 
server as part of the authentication procedure towards the target web service. 
The CASHMA authentication server is in charge to transmit a certificate to the client. The 
certificate is composed by the following information: i) Timestamp and sequence number useful to 
univocally identify each certificate, and to protect from replay attacks; ii) ID is the user ID, e.g., a 
number; iii) Decision represents the outcome of the verification procedure carried out on the server 
side; iv) the expiration time of the session - the absolute instant of time at which the session should 
expire-, dynamically assigned by the CASHMA authentication server.  
The execution of the protocol is composed of two consecutive phases: the initial phase (Figure 2), 
and the maintenance phase.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 Initial phase in case of successful user authentication 
Figure 1 Overall view of the CASHMA architecture 
55
  
 
Initial phase. This phase is structured as follows: 
Step 0 - The user (the client) contacts the web service for a service request; the web service replies that 
a valid certificate from the CASHMA authentication service is required for authentication. 
Step 1 - Using the CASHMA application, the client contacts the CASHMA authentication server. The 
first step consists in acquiring and sending at time t0 the data for the different biometric traits, 
specifically selected to perform a strong authentication procedure. The application explicitly indicates 
to the user the biometric traits to be provided and possible retries. 
Step 2 - The CASHMA authentication server analyzes the biometric data received and performs an 
authentication procedure. Two different possibilities arise here. If the user identity is not verified (the 
global trust level is below the trust threshold gmin), new or additional biometric data are requested (back 
to step 1) until the minimum trust threshold gmin is reached. Instead if the user identity is successfully 
verified, the CASHMA authentication server authenticates the user, computes an initial timeout of 
length T0 for the user session, set the expiration time at T0+t0, creates the CASHMA certificate and 
sends it to the client.  
Step 3 - The client forwards the CASHMA certificate to the web service coupling it with its request. 
Step 4 - The web service reads the certificate and authorizes the client to use the requested service until 
expiration time. 
The maintenance phase is composed of three steps, analogous to Step 1, Step 2 and Step 3, 
repeated iteratively [2]. 
2.3 Security solutions in place and assumptions 
We identify the following initial set of security solutions and assumptions for our security 
analysis. First, all communications between the components of CASHMA architecture are through 
encrypted communication channels, using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). With SSL, the channel is 
protected against replay attacks using the MAC (Message Authentication Code) computed from the 
MAC secret, the sequence number, the message length, the message contents, and two fixed character 
strings [8]. Further, biometric data is transmitted in raw format from client to the CASHMA 
authentication service, and this has been a design decision applied to reduce the dimension, 
intrusiveness and complexity of the application installed on the client device [2]. However, biometric 
data in not stored on the client: the templates are stored on the CASHMA authentication service side. 
3 Risk Assessment of the CASHMA Protocol 
In this section we perform a qualitative risk assessment of the CASHMA protocol, based on the 
methodology of NIST SP-800-30 [3]. The purpose of the assessment is to establish if some of the 
steps of the protocol and of the entities involved may be exposed to relevant security risks; this 
activity supports decisions related to protocol modifications and improvements, where needed. 
3.1 Definitions  
In order to describe the details of the risk assessment, we first introduce some useful definitions 
from NIST SP-800-30 [3]. 
• A threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact a system via 
unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, or modification of information, and/or denial of 
service. Threat events are caused by threat sources, i.e. hostile cyber or physical attacks; human 
errors of omission or commission; structural failures of organization-controlled resources (e.g., 
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hardware, software, environmental controls); and natural and man-made disasters, accidents, and 
failures beyond the control of the organization. 
• Vulnerability is a weakness in the system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation 
that can be exploited by a threat source. 
• The likelihood of occurrence is a weighted risk factor based on an analysis of the probability that a 
given threat is capable of exploiting a given vulnerability (or set of vulnerabilities). The likelihood 
risk factor combines an estimate of the likelihood that the threat event will be initiated with an 
estimate of the likelihood of impact (i.e., the likelihood that the threat event results in adverse 
impacts). For adversarial threats, an assessment of likelihood of occurrence is typically based on: (i) 
adversary intent; (ii) adversary capability; and (iii) adversary targeting. 
• The level of impact from a threat event is the magnitude of harm that can be expected to result from 
the consequences of unauthorized behavior. 
• Risk is a function of the likelihood of a threat event’s occurrence and potential adverse impact 
should the event occur. 
3.2 Assessment Methodology 
We first determine which types of threat sources are to be considered during risk assessment. We 
consider adversarial threat sources only, as opposed to non-adversarial like human errors, structural 
failures or natural disasters. The characteristics of the identified attackers are summarized in Table 1 
and are adapted from the quantitative security evaluation of [2].  
A Hacker (Hk) represents an external individual having high technological capabilities but 
moderate resources. An Insider (Is) is an internal attacker, having minimal capabilities and 
organization-level resources. 
The threat events that we consider can be divided in transport level threats: spoofing, forgery, 
unauthorized access, eavesdropping, message corruption; and system level threats: brute force attack, 
reuse of residuals, insertion of imposter data, component replacement, database compromise, [4], [5], 
[6], and [7]. 
In the following sections, we will rate the likelihood of occurrence as a combination of i) the 
likelihood that a threat is initiated, possibly related to the attack gain, and ii) the likelihood that a 
threat event, once initiated, will result in adverse impact. The likelihood of occurrence determination 
is based on authors’ experience and confirmed by the CVSS framework [12]. 
The overall likelihood is expressed in a qualitative scale: Very Low (VL), if the threat event is 
highly unlikely to occur and have adverse impact, Low (L) if it is unlikely, Moderate (M) if it is 
somewhat likely, High (H) if it is highly likely, and Very High (VH) if it is almost certain.   
As discussed in [3], impacts from threat events are determined considering (i) the characteristics of 
the threat sources that can initiate the events; (ii) the vulnerabilities/predisposing conditions identified, 
and (iii) the susceptibility reflecting the safeguards/countermeasures planned or implemented to 
impede such events. The assessment scale is Very Low (VL); meaning that the adverse effect is 
negligible; Low (L), if the impact is expected to be limited; Moderate (M), if the threat event is 
expected to have a serious adverse effect; High (H), in case of severe or catastrophic impact; and Very 
High (VH), if the threat event is expected to have multiple severe or catastrophic adverse effect. 
The level of risk is determined as a combination of: (i) the impact resulting from the events; and 
(ii) the likelihood of the events occurring, as summarized in Table 2. 
 
 Hacker (Hk) Insider (Is) 
Access External Internal 
Resources Moderate Organization 
Capabilities High Minimal 
Table 1: Attackers and their characteristics. 
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In the following, we call: Hk, and Is the attackers, being a Hacker or Insider, respectively, C the 
legitimate client, AS the Authentication Server, WS: the Web Service. 
For space constraints and in order to not being too redundant, the assessment is performed only for 
the initial phase of the protocol, but it can be easily extended to the maintenance phase too, that is 
analogous. 
3.3 Transport Level Threats Analysis 
Spoofing. The spoofing threat (masquerade) is a communication level threat that happens when an 
entity pretend to be recognized as a different entity, possibly laying the foundation for other threats 
like forgery or unauthorized access [4]. For instance, it can be accomplished using stolen user 
credentials. Traditional countermeasures are: the usage of strong authentication, avoiding the storage 
of secretes (e.g. passwords) in plaintext, avoiding transfer of credentials in plaintext over the wire, and 
protecting communication with SSL [5]. Based on the protocol description and assumptions, 
CASHMA is integrating most of the countermeasures to this threat. However, we identified four 
different points of vulnerability, and the related threats are referred as S1, S2, S3 and S4, shown in 
Appendix A Table 3. 
The threat Spoofing S1 specifically refers to step 1 of the CASHMA protocol (Figure 2): the 
adversary injects believable biometric raw data into a message, claiming to be C, and obtains a valid 
certificate from the AS. Noteworthy, the attacker needs previous possession of the biometric raw data 
of the legitimate user. An Insider may be somehow capable of acquiring the biometrics needed, helped 
by the proximity and knowledge of C habits. In order to perform step 1 of the protocol and act as 
being C, it should send the data to the AS. This may be harder for Is because we consider that high 
skills are needed to circumvent the SSL protocol. We consider as Moderate the overall likelihood. On 
the contrary, if the threat agent is a Hk, it may be hard to obtain access to the set of biometric raw data 
remotely. If the data are obtained, the Hk may possess enough capabilities to circumvent SSL 
protocol. The overall likelihood is Moderate also for Hk.  
If the attacker is able to accomplish the spoofing attack, it may lay foundations for subsequent 
threat events: being recognized as C, and obtained a valid certificate, X may send a valid request to 
the Web Service. For this reason, we determine as High the Impact of this threat. As shown in 
Appendix A Table 3, the resulting Risk is Moderate for both the attackers. 
The threat Spoofing S2 refers both to steps 1 and 2 of the protocol. On step 1, the attacker spoofs 
the AS, receives the biometric traits of C, with detrimental effects on C’s privacy. In addition it can be 
used in step 1 of a subsequent iteration of the protocol to act as being C towards AS (Spoofing S1). As 
a result, we consider High the Impact of this threat. On step 2, instead, if X can corrupt a certificate 
and claim to be the AS, the corruption probably provides a fake and useless certificate to C. We 
consider unlikely to spoof the AS for the Insider and Moderate the likelihood of occurrence of S2 for 
the Hacker.  
Likelihood 
 (Threat Event Occurs 
and Results in Adverse 
Impact) 
Level of Impact 
Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
Very High Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
High Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
Moderate Very Low Low Moderate Moderate High 
Low Very Low Low Low Low Moderate 
Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Low Low 
Table 2: Level of risk determination, from NIST SP-800-30 [3]. 
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The threat Spoofing S3 applies to step 3 of the protocol. The attacker spoofs the WS, receiving the 
request and a valid certificate from C. These data can be useful in step 1 to spoof C (see Spoofing S1). 
However, a CASHMA certificate integrates information like timestamp and user ID that protect from 
replay attacks (see also Message corruption M1). For this reason the impact can be considered 
Moderate: the gain is not so relevant if the obtained data is not useful for the attacker. 
The threat Spoofing S4 applies to step 3 of the protocol. The attacker sends a request with a valid 
certificate, obtaining the access to the service provided by WS. The impact is High, but we consider 
the successful reuse of a valid certificate unlikely, because it is univocally identified by Timestamp 
and sequence number. 
Possible countermeasures for threats S1-S4 range from sending the message coupled with its 
digital signature (measure useful for auditing and as a deterrent), adding a further level of encryption 
using AS’s public key or avoid passing the raw biometric data over the wire. 
Forgery. The forgery happens when an entity fabricates information and claims that such 
information was received from another entity or sent to another entity [4]. For the CASHMA protocol, 
we discuss two main forgery threats, F1 and F2, shown in Appendix A Table 4. 
For threat Forgery F1, the attacker fabricates one or more biometric traits in order to spoof C’s 
identity. The occurrence likelihood depends on the kind of biometric traits necessary for the 
authentication, on their FRR (False Rejection Rate) and on the FRR of the system. However, as 
discussed for threat S1, we consider unlikely to forge a set of traits and provide them continuously for 
the remote Hk, and moderately likely for the Is. For this reason, even if the threat has a High impact 
(especially if the application protected is critical), the risk can be considered low for Hk. Instead, we 
consider a Moderate risk for the Is. An additional countermeasure useful to reduce this risk is to not 
transmit raw biometric over the wire. This threat is related to Sensor Spoofing (Appendix B Table 8). 
The threat Forgery F2 refers to the forgery of a CASHMA certificate. We can consider Unlikely 
for the Insider attacker to forge a certificate and Moderate the likelihood of occurrence if the threat 
source is Hk. The impact is High. As a countermeasure, the message containing the certificate sent on 
step 3 to the WS, should be digitally signed by the sender. 
Unauthorized Access. When an entity accesses data in violation to the security policy in force [4] 
we have the so called unauthorized access threat event. We comment the two threats U1 and U2, 
Appendix A Table 5. With the threat Unauthorized access U1, we refer to the event of getting 
(physically or remotely) possession of C’s device or workstation, but not the critical functions only 
provided through continuous authentication. We consider the likelihood for a remote attacker (Hk) as 
Moderate, and High for the Is. However, the resulting impact and risk are Low, because as we defined 
in Section 2.3, no biometric data is stored on the device. 
The threat Unauthorized access U2 refers instead to the access to the critical functions/services 
protected with the continuous authentication. Proper configuration of security permission is able to 
mitigate this threat. No modifications to the protocol are required in this case. We rate the likelihood 
and the related risk as Low. No additional countermeasures are proposed for these two threats. 
Eavesdropping. Eavesdropping (or Sniffing) is a breach of confidentiality by unauthorized 
monitoring of communications [4]. We detect the threats E1, E2, and E3 for CASHMA, shown in 
Appendix A Table 6. A sniffing happens when an attacker captures packets from the network and 
reads the data content in search of sensitive information like biometric data, secret keys, certificates or 
any kind of confidential information. Traditionally, the full encryption of communication, including 
credentials, prevents sniffed packets from being usable to an attacker. SSL is an example of 
encryption solution [5]. 
The threat Eavesdropping E1 refers to the sniffing of the message on step 1, containing the 
biometric raw data of C. Referring to Section 2.3, the message on step 1 is transmitted through an SSL 
channel, thus it is encrypted with a session key that only C and AS know. We consider Moderate the 
likelihood of occurrence for E1 if the attacker possesses high capabilities, as the Hk, and Low if is Is. 
The impact is High, because obtaining the biometrics may cause identity theft. Possible 
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countermeasures are a subset of what proposed for the Spoofing threats: adding a further level of 
encryption using AS’s public key or avoid passing the raw biometric data over the wire. 
The threat Eavesdropping E2 refers to the sniffing of the message on step 2 or step 3, containing 
the CAHSMA certificate. Again, we assess the likelihood as Moderate for Hk and Low for Is. The 
impact can be considered Moderate, as discussed for Spoofing S3 threat, being that the CASHMA 
certificate contains ID and timestamp that protect from replay attacks. 
Message Corruption. The message corruption threats refer to the situation in which the integrity 
of transferred data is compromised by unauthorized copying, deletion, insertion, modification, 
reordering, replay or delay [4]. For the CASHMA protocol, we detect the set of message corruption 
threats shown in Appendix A Table 7. Referring to Section 2.3, the SSL encryption and the MAC 
address protect the protocol from this threat. 
The threat Message corruption M1 happens when the attacker copies and replays one of the 
messages, for instance the message sent on step 1 containing the biometrics of C. We consider as Low 
the impact of the simple replaying of a message (without modification) thanks to the SSL encryption 
already available as discussed above.  
The threat Message corruption M2 applies to the deletion of a message sent on steps 1 to 4. If the 
message on step 1 with biometric traits is deleted, no verification is done. However, it does not have 
any relevant consequence in terms of security. If the message on step 2 containing the certificate is 
deleted, the client has to restart from the first step of the protocol. If the message sent on step 3 with 
the certificate is deleted, the client has to send the same message again, or if the session is expired, 
restart from step 1. Finally, if the “access granted until timeout” message (step 4) is deleted, C waits 
for the message until the session expiration. We can consider all these threats together having a Low 
impact and a resulting Low risk. 
The threat Message corruption M3 refers to the insertion of a message in between the information 
flow from sender and receiver (from C to AS, from AS to C, from C to WS or from WS to C). The 
impact is Moderate, being that the insertion of a message can be used for instance to conduct a 
spoofing threat. However, in CASHMA messages from one party cannot be inserted into the other's 
output, since they use independent MAC secrets [10]. Consequently, the likelihood for this threat is 
set to Low. The resulting risk is set to Moderate if the attacker is Hk, and to Low for the Is. 
The threat Message corruption M4 represents a resequencing attack conducted against AS. Again, 
it is not likely due to the encryption obtained with SSL. Moreover, the impact is limited. For instance, 
inverting messages in step 2 and 4 would make C thinking to be able to access the WS, when actually 
it is not. So it just results in unsatisfied user due to unavailable or delayed service. 
For threat Message corruption M5, we can distinguish four events, one for each step from 1 to 4. 
Step 1: The attacker corrupts the message with the biometric traits of C, but cannot act as C. The 
corruption makes the verification procedure to reject C, causing a DoS. Step 2: The attacker corrupts 
the message containing the certificate, alters the timestamp, the sequence number, the expiration time, 
the decision, with remarkable consequences for the subsequent steps. Step 3: The attacker alters a 
valid certificate, generated for C when it is being sent to the WS. This impacts the next step. Step 4: if 
messages are corrupted by X, the WS denies the access for C or grant it for a time window lower than 
normal, thus provoking a Denial of Service.  
3.4 System Level Threats Analysis 
In this section we analyze a set of system level threats, shown in Appendix B Table 4, which are 
typical of a biometric system [6].  
Brute force. Brute force attacks in general rely on computational power to crack secrets secured 
with hashing and encryption. The Brute Force B1 threat refers to the submission of a huge set of 
biometric traits to the sensors embedded or connected to the client workstation with the objective of 
finding a trait (or a set of traits) that let the attacker to be authenticated. However, the CASHMA 
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protocol as it is should maintain Low the impact of this threat, because the number of retries is 
limited, as discussed in Section 0. As a result, also the risk is Low for both the attackers. 
Sensor Spoofing. An attacker provides a set of fake physical or digital biometric traits designed to 
circumvent the biometric system. The CASHMA system integrates a multi-modal biometric system: 
the user has to provide a set of traits in order to be authenticated. The multi-modality itself can be 
considered a first defensive measure to this threat [6]. The impact of this threat is High. We assess a 
Moderate risk for the Insider attacker, which may have direct access to the device and the biometric 
sensors. An additional countermeasure that can reduce the risk is the liveness detection to ensure the 
biometric sample presented to the reader is from a live person. 
Reuse of residuals. An attacker gains somehow access to valid biometric data and reuses it. As 
discussed in the assumptions, no biometric data is saved on client’s device. However, is important to 
defend from this threat, because the attacker may obtain data in other ways (i.e. through 
Eavesdropping). The risk is Moderate and the Impact is considered High for the Hk attacker. An 
effective defensive measure is prohibiting identical samples being used consecutively. 
Database compromise. An attacker obtains access to template repository and is able to read, 
modify or substitute templates. We consider Low the likelihood of this threat: we assume that the 
CASHMA authentication server implements a very efficient and complete set of access control 
mechanisms. However, the impact of this threat is very high for template security and users’ privacy, 
and, as a consequence, the risk for Hk is Moderate. To reduce the risk, may be necessary to introduce 
additional defensive measures as biometric cryptosystems or cancellable biometrics. With cancellable 
biometrics, only the transformed data are stored and if these data are compromised, a new transform 
can be applied, thus replacing the original template [6]. Biometric cryptosystems, instead, are 
designed to securely bind a digital key to a biometric or generate a digital key from a biometric, 
offering solutions to and biometric template protection, together with biometric-dependent key-release 
[11]. With the integration of one of these countermeasures, we imagine a reduction of the Impact due 
to database compromise from Very High to High, which together with a Low likelihood determines a 
Low risk. 
4 Conclusions and Future work 
This paper presents a qualitative risk assessment of a biometric continuous authentication protocol. 
The CASHMA protocol guarantees high security of user session, monitoring in background the user’s 
actions, through a continuous and transparent acquisition of multiple biometric traits, and computing 
an adaptive, trust-based, timeout. Nevertheless, we show that the introduction of some additional 
defense measures would considerably increase system’s security. 
Our assessment complies with NIST methodology: we identify the main threats both for the 
transmission and the biometric system level; we assess the likelihood of occurrence and the impact for 
each threat, distinguishing two different attackers’ profiles. Then, we determined the risk related to 
each threat occurrence. The assessment highlighted a set of threats whose risk is considerate Moderate 
and for which we discussed further security countermeasures as additional encryption layers, or 
templates protection solutions. The modifications are capable of reducing the risk for all the threats 
considered and for this reason are recommended to be included in the protocol or in the architecture. 
In future work, we plan to investigate the possibility to introduce modifications to the CASHMA 
protocol in order to provide additional security requirements as, for instance, the non-repudiation of 
user actions.  
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Appendix A. Risk Assessment and Countermeasures for Transport Level Threats  
 
 
 
Threat Description Attacker Risk Assessment Countermeasures New Risk Assessment Likelihood Impact Risk Likelihood Impact Risk 
Spoofing 
S1 
The attacker pretends 
towards AS to be C 
Hk M H M 
1) Digital signature of the message. 
2) Additional encryption of the message with 
receiver’s public key. 
3) Do not transmit raw biometric data over the wire: 
encrypt biometric data on client-side 
L H L 
Is M H M L H L 
Spoofing 
S2 
X pretends towards 
C to be AS (step 1 
and 2) 
Hk M H M L H L 
Is L H L VL H L 
Spoofing 
S3 
X pretends towards 
C to be WS (step 3) 
Hk M M M L M L 
Is L M L L M L 
Spoofing 
S4 
X pretends towards 
WS to be C (step 3) 
Hk L H L L H L 
Is L H L VL H L 
Table 3: Spoofing Threats in CASHMA 
 
Threat Description Attacker Risk Assessment Countermeasures New Risk Assessment Likelihood Impact Risk Likelihood Impact Risk 
Forgery 
F1 
The attacker fabricates one or more 
biometric traits in order to spoof C’s 
identity  
Hk L H L Do not transmit raw biometric data over 
the wire: encrypt biometric data on 
client-side 
L H L 
Is M H M L H L 
Forgery 
F2 
X fabricates a fake certificate, 
claiming that was received from AS 
Hk M H M Digital signature of the message. L H L Is L H L L H L 
Table 4: Forgery Threats in CASHMA 
 
Threat Description Attacker Risk Assessment Likelihood Impact Risk 
Unauthorized 
Access U1 
The attacker gets  possession 
of C’s device or workstation 
Hk M L L 
Is H L L 
Unauthorized 
Access U2 
The attacker obtains access 
to the data protected by the 
continuous authentication 
Hk L H L 
Is L H L 
Table 5: Unauthorized Access Threats in CASHMA 
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Threat Description Attacker Risk Assessment Countermeasures New Risk Assessment Likelihood Impact Risk Likelihood Impact Risk 
Eavesdropping 
E1 
X sniffs the message on step 1 
(see Figure 2), with the 
biometric traits of C 
Hk M H M 1) Additional encryption of the 
message with receiver’s public key. 
2) Do not pass raw biometric data 
over the wire: encrypt biometric data 
on client-side 
L H L 
Is L H L L H L 
Eavesdropping 
E2 
X sniffs the message on step 2 
or step 3 (see Figure 2), 
containing the certificate. 
Hk M M M Additional encryption of the message 
with receiver’s public key. 
L M L 
Is L M L L M L 
Table 6: Eavesdropping Threats in CASHMA 
 
Threat Description Attacker Risk Assessment Countermeasures New Risk Assessment Likelihood Impact Risk Likelihood Impact Risk 
Message 
Corruption 
Threat M1 
X copies a message (step 1 to 4) 
and replays it to the receiver. 
Hk M L L Do not pass raw biometric data over the 
wire: encrypt biometric data on client-
side 
L L L 
Is L L L L L L 
Message 
Corruption 
Threat M2 
X deletes a message (steps 1 to 4) 
Hk M L L 
n/a 
n/a n/a n/a 
Is L L L n/a n/a n/a 
Message 
Corruption 
Threat M3 
X inserts a message in between 
the information flow from C to 
AS (and vice versa) or from C to 
WS (and vice versa). 
Hk M M M 
1) Additional encryption of the message 
with receiver’s public key. 
2) Do not pass raw biometric data over 
the wire: encrypt biometric data on 
client-side 
L M L 
Is L M L L M L 
Message 
Corruption 
Threat M4 
X changes the sequence of 
messages for AS 
Hk M L L 
n/a 
n/a n/a n/a 
Is L L L n/a n/a n/a 
Message 
Corruption 
Threat M5 
X alters a message in a 
plausible way so that C and/or 
AS and/or WS cannot detect the 
modification 
Hk M M M 1) Digital signature of the message 
2) Additional encryption of the message 
with receiver’s public key. 
L M L 
Is L M L L M L 
Table 7: Message Corruption Threats in CASHMA 
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Appendix B. Risk Assessment and Countermeasures for System Level Threats  
 
Threat Description Attacker Risk Assessment Countermeasures New Risk Assessment Likelihood Impact Risk Likelihood Impact Risk 
Brute Force 
The attacker submits a huge set of 
biometric traits to the sensors embedded 
or connected to the client workstation to 
find a trait (or a set of traits) that let 
him/her authenticate 
Hk L L L 
n/a 
n/a n/a n/a 
Is M L L n/a n/a n/a 
Sensor 
Spoofing 
An attacker provides a set of fake 
physical or digital biometric traits 
designed to circumvent the biometric 
system 
Hk L H L 
Liveness detection 
L H L 
Is M H M L H L 
Reuse of 
residuals 
An attacker gains somehow access to 
biometric data and reuses it. 
Hk M H M Prohibiting identical samples 
being used consecutively.  
L H L 
Is L H L L H L 
Database 
Compromise 
An attacker obtains access to template 
repository and is able to read, modify and 
substitute the templates. 
Hk L VH M 
Biometric Encryption or 
Cancellable biometrics 
L H L 
Is VL VH L VL H L 
Table 8: System level Threats in CASHMA 
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